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 OPTIMIZATION OF SECOND FAULT DETECTION THRESHOLDS 
TO MAXIMIZE MISSION PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS 
Evan J. Anzalone*  
In order to support manned spaceflight safety requirements, the Space Launch 
System (SLS) has defined program-level requirements for key systems to ensure 
successful operation under single fault conditions. The SLS program has also 
levied requirements relating to the capability of the Inertial Navigation System 
to detect a second fault. This detection functionality is required in order to feed 
abort analysis and ensure crew safety. Increases in navigation state error due to 
sensor faults in a purely inertial system can drive the vehicle outside of its op-
erational as-designed environmental and performance envelope. As this perfor-
mance outside of first fault detections is defined and controlled at the vehicle 
level, it allows for the use of system level margins to increase probability of 
mission success on the operational edges of the design. A top-down approach is 
utilized to assess vehicle sensitivity to second sensor faults. A wide range of 
failure scenarios in terms of both fault magnitude and time is used for assess-
ment. The approach also utilizes a schedule to change fault detection thresholds 
autonomously. These individual values are optimized along a nominal trajectory 
in order to maximize probability of mission success in terms of system-level in-
sertion requirements while minimizing the probability of false positives. This 
paper will describe an approach integrating Genetic Algorithms and Monte Car-
lo analysis to tune the threshold parameters to maximize vehicle resilience to 
second fault events over an ascent mission profile. The analysis approach and 
performance assessment and verification will be presented to demonstrate the 
applicability of this approach to second fault detection optimization to maximize 
mission probability of success through taking advantage of existing margin. 
INTRODUCTION 
To accommodate manned spaceflight safety requirements with regards to Navigation, the 
Space Launch System (SLS) utilizes an internally redundant Inertial Navigation System (INS) 
with built-in capability to detect, isolate, and recover from first failure conditions and still main-
tain adherence to performance requirements.  The unit utilizes multiple hardware- and software-
level techniques to enable detection, isolation, and recovery from these events in terms of its 
built-in Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) algorithms, which are outside of the 
scope of this work and are well documented in literature1,2,3,4. Successful operation is defined in 
terms of sufficient navigation accuracy at insertion while operating under worst case single sensor 
outages (gyroscope and accelerometer faults at launch).  
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As described5, the SLS program has taken a model-based approach to requirements develop-
ment and negotiation in an effort to reduce system-level requirements and streamline systems en-
gineering and management. At the vehicle level, the primary GNC-specific performance require-
ments on the INS are in terms of vehicle performance to a fixed trajectory. For this work, only 
faults that would affect sensor performance are considered. Faults that would manifest from other 
hardware failures, such as power supply or external communications, are captured through other 
methods. These requirements are then levied onto the prime contractor whose responsibility is to 
select or contract out the design and building of individual components that meet these high-level 
requirements. For the SLS effort, the INS has been implemented as the Redundant Inertial Navi-
gation Unit (RINU) being developed and designed by Honeywell International6. 
For the SLS program, the INS primary performance requirement is to meet its insertion re-
quirements over a reference trajectory under single fault conditions. This is proven through dy-
namic analysis provided by the vendor that demonstrates execution of flight algorithms with as-
built sensor-level specifications. Sensor fault events are modeled as discrete events resulting in a 
change in sensor specification. Through the use of flight fault detection, isolation, and recovery 
software, these changes in sensor output are detected and removed from the integrated vehicle 
solution, minimizing their impact on its capability to meet system requirements. Statistical analy-
sis then demonstrates that the INS meets its requirements under faulted conditions.  
In addition to first fault detection and recovery, the SLS program has also levied requirements 
relating to the capability of the INS to detect a second fault. This detection functionality is re-
quired in order to feed abort analysis and ensure crew safety. The criteria for operation under sec-
ond faults allows for a larger set of achievable missions in terms of potential fault conditions over 
time due to the significant consequences of an untrustworthy navigation system. As this perfor-
mance is defined and controlled at the vehicle level, it allows for the use of system level margins 
to increase probability of mission success on the operational edges of the design space.  A per-
formance requirement on second fault detection was not levied through requirement flow-down to 
the vendor. As the second fault detection has much larger effects on vehicle performance, aborts, 
and operations, the responsibility for tuning the threshold parameters for this scenario lies within 
the SLS integrated GNC Team. For this analysis, the performance is defined in terms of meeting 
orbit insertion requirement with an integrated vehicle, as opposed to accuracy at the end of refer-
ence trajectory running open-loop simulation.  
To support vehicle performance analysis and design, the SLS program utilizes Design Math 
Models (DMMs) that can be integrated into existing high fidelity dynamic analysis tools, such as 
the primary simulation tool MAVERIC7 for 6 degree of freedom (DOF) Monte Carlo-based anal-
ysis. This model is intended to be verified against the vendor documentation and software mod-
els, and validated against flight hardware. As such, this software model is considered to be an 
analytically equivalent representation of the hardware, allowing for standalone and integrated 
analysis to assess performance, sensitivities, and fault detection capability. This allows for in-
creased confidence in the vehicle's integrated performance prior to flight, and reduces the need 
for expensive flight testing. This allows for optimization of any input parameters, of which fault 
detection thresholds are considered. For the analysis that follows, this model is considered to be a 
black box with a defined generic input schedule.  
FAULT ASSESSMENT APPROACH 
With the design models in hand, it is possible to assess the capability in terms of detection 
times and navigation accuracy at the end of the mission through the use of open and closed analy-
sis. Due to having a verified model, the results have a high confidence of being accurate. The two 
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analysis scenarios allow for both standalone and vehicle-integrated analysis. While the full closed 
loop simulation provides insight into coupling between Guidance, Navigation, and Controls func-
tions, open-loop navigation analysis allows for focused insights that can guide closed-loop analy-
sis, with a dramatically improved execution time. For scenarios requiring closed loop analysis, a 
local cluster asset is utilized to improve run-time.  
First-Fault Analysis Results 
The initial thresholds were optimized and assessed at the vendor- and VM-level using a refer-
ence trajectory coincident with SLS Design Analysis Cycle 2 assessments in support of vehicle 
Critical Design Review. These thresholds were assessed against this mission as part of the RINU 
Software Verification efforts, as well as in completed RINU Model DMM verification tasks. In 
order to assess their performance against the current missions as planned, all missions assessed 
have included one accelerometer and one gyroscope failure at launch. This was simulated as a 
large magnitude bias shift (1G and 10 deg/hr respectively) applied at Mission Elapsed Time 
(MET) = 0. This simulated error provides a "worst-case" sensor out scenario (defined as flying 
the entire mission with a reduced number of accelerometers and gyroscopes, resulting in reduced 
sensor accuracy). Implementation of this fault scenario also matches assumptions used in verifi-
cation of hardware requirements. 
To expand the scope of these results, the scope of failure scenarios was expanded to include 
varying magnitude faults and times. For these scenarios, two primary metrics of interest are orbit 
insertion requirements, Semi-Major Axis and Radius of Apogee. Two sets of 4000 runs were 
generated using the full 6DOF MAVERIC vehicle simulation, with faults of random magnitude 
occurring across the trajectory. The plots in Figure 1 and Figure 2 present scatterplots of the re-
sulting orbital insertion capability in terms of 3-sigma bounds (the error in insertion for each case 
was divided by the requirement; i.e. values outside of +/- 1 do not meet requirements). From 
these results it is clear to see the first FDIR detection thresholds are working adequately to detect 
and isolate any first failures causing deviation from insertion requirements. It also provides in-
sight into the remaining margin of the vehicle in terms of navigation performance. 
 
Figure 1. Insertion Errors due to Randomized Accelerometer Bias Fault (fault in g's) 
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Figure 2. Insertion Errors due to Randomized Gyroscope Fault (fault in deg/hr) 
Second-Fault Analysis Results 
A requirement does not exist to specifically define FDIR performance under second fault sce-
narios. This is implicitly tied to mission insertion requirements and probability of mission success 
through the coupling of second faults to RINU overall trustworthiness. Upon detection of a sec-
ond failure of a similar sensor type, the RINU is defined to be failed as a whole, and its output 
inertial state can no longer be trusted. At this point, the vehicle has no knowledge as to the severi-
ty of the failure event or the specific sensor acting out of specifications, and this error is integrat-
ed into the navigation state. This can cause immediate problems in term of flight control interac-
tion (if the error occurs on a gyroscope), and limits the ability of the vehicle to accurately be 
guided to the desired insertion orbit in the case of accelerometer errors (as well as gyroscope er-
rors). For second failure determination, the intent of the FDIR thresholds is to detect any failure 
which would cause the vehicle to not achieve its orbit insertion requirements. As such, the prima-
ry goal is to open the values to reduce sensitivity and remove margin above the RINU's insertion 
requirements to improve the probability of mission success.  
The first step in opening up the thresholds is understanding the margin available in terms of 
vehicle insertion requirements. For this assessment, the standalone implementation of the RINU-
DMM model was used to simulate second failure scenarios of a gyroscope and accelerometer in-
dependently and capture insertion capability against the reference trajectory. Figure 3 demon-
strates the capability of the vehicle to meet insertion requirements under 2nd accelerometer fail-
ures. These were simulated as sensor error bias shifts on a particular channel. Throughout this 
analysis, the focus will be on bias shift errors, with further results demonstrating robustness 
against other potential sensor fault error manifestations. The horizontal axis provide the log(base 
10) magnitude in g's (left)  and time of fault (right). The vertical axis represents the ability of the 
vehicle to meet insertion requirements as the fraction of the insertion error over the requirement 
and plotted on a log scale. As shown, increases in accelerometer errors directly integrated into 
state errors over time, with the induced error scaled approximately to a product of the time re-
maining in flight squared times the additional accelerometer bias fault (representing the integra-
tion of the faulted accelerometer into the RINU's equations of motion). All of these failure magni-
tudes were detected by the RINU. Although it is limited, there do exist a group of small failure 
magnitudes across simulation time that do adequately meet RINU insertion performance. This 
shows that a slight tweaking of the accelerometer detection thresholds for second fault has only a 
small bit of room for improving vehicle probability of success. 
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Figure 3: Insertion Errors with Second Accelerometer Fault (fault in log(g)'s ) 
Similar behavior can be observed in terms of the ability to detect second gyroscope fault 
events. The capability for this is demonstrated in Figure 4 below. For example, failure magni-
tudes less than 3.6 deg/hour were able to meet mission requirements, but were detected by the 
baseline thresholds. The performance with respect to gyroscope errors exhibits a much stronger 
correlation to the time of the fault. For example, as opposed to the fairly steady (and large) effect 
of accelerometer bias shifts across flight, large bias shifts on a gyroscope have decreasing effect 
on orbital insertion parameters. This time-based behavior strongly demonstrates the need for us-
ing a schedule to change performance over flight as a function of time, to match the changing 
response of the fault scenarios coupled to magnitude and time of fault.  
 
Figure 4: Insertion Errors with Second Gyroscope Fault (fault in log(degs/hr) ) 
 
Threshold Scheduling 
The SLS INS's threshold values are delivered as-built from the hardware vendor to optimize 
performance under 1st fault scenarios. Conservative detection of small failure events (which if 
undetected, would not cause large mission violations), is desirable in order to ensure meeting in-
sertion requirements.  Under nominal flight conditions, these are sized in order to ensure insertion 
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into the desired orbit for a reference trajectory, with margin captured at the VM level relative to 
vehicle requirements as identified above. The INS includes the capability to store a large number 
of unique sets of these parameters (each called a phase) that can be externally commanded (either 
from ground or onboard Flight Software (FSW) interfaces). The implementation of this function-
ality allows the potential to optimize FDIR performance across the design trajectory. The current 
FSW design includes the ability to load a different set of phases prior to launch and modify the 
current phase on the ground or in flight based on flight conditions. The design of these phases 
will be tuned to each individual flight, to optimize detection capability over the planned trajecto-
ry. This allows the sensitivity of the fault detection algorithms to change due to external drivers, 
such as the dynamics of the trajectory or detected failures.  
The vehicle's FSW algorithms hold responsibility for tracking any detected failures and report-
ing this information to the crew and ground through collection, recording, and processing of 
hardware telemetry. Thus, the system can change FDIR parameters from FSW based upon ob-
served failure conditions as well as MET via predefined schedule. This enables fine control over 
the detection capability to allow for tuning of the INS's FDIR capability (and the probability of 
missing a fault event or false detection of an event as a function of flight conditions). The primary 
operational FDIR modes are defined in Table 1. 
Table 1. Defined FDIR Modes of Operation 
Mode Description 
Nom No detected sensor channel failures 
AF One accelerometer channel has faulted, but all gyroscopes are still good 
GF One Gyroscope channel has faulted, but all accelerometers are still good 
AFGF One Gyroscope and one Accelerometer have each faulted 
 
The GN&C analysis will define the FDIR parameters to operate in each scenario. This allows 
for capturing all operational modes of the RINU in terms of per-sensor failure detection capabil-
ity. The schedule table format is defined in Table 2, with notional phase inputs. The FDIR param-
eters and phase schedule will be updated as the mission trajectory and vehicle dynamics data are 
matured.  An additional table is used when the vehicle is operating under off-nominal conditions. 
These flight scenarios are defined by the loss of an engine (either through software-commanded, 
or hardware-fault) during flight. Loss of an engine during boost and core flight has a large effect 
on vehicle dynamics and FDIR detection capability. In order to maintain capability, the phase will 
need to be chosen from an alternate table that is independent of MET. This data is meant to be a 
more robust, guarded set of algorithms, to account for the potential of an engine-out at any point 
along the trajectory. This logic can be enabled by tracking individual engine operational status. 
Table 2. FDIR Phase Schedule 
MET Range (ms) (from, to) NOM AF GF AFGF 
0 10000 2 9 16 23 
10020 50000 3 10 17 24 
50020 120000 4 11 18 25 
120020 150000 5 12 19 26 
150020 200000 6 13 20 27 
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200020 300000 7 14 21 28 
300020 600000 8 15 22 29 
   
THRESHOLD SCHEDULE OPTIMIZATION 
Further sensitivity analysis of the potential parameters included in each phase informed the 
difficulty of tweaking of and coupling between the individual inputs. In order to maintain con-
servatism, the primary focus is to open up the thresholds to more cases that would meet insertion 
requirements, while not allowing an undetected faults that would not meet mission. This analysis 
allowed for focus on a reduced set of design variables. In order to provide more detailed tuning of 
the FDIR algorithms, a batch of optimizations on these terms were performed. These took ad-
vantage of a nonlinear optimization algorithm to minimize the following fitness function: 
 FITNESS = -1*(number of cases that meet requirement and not detected) + (number of 
cases that did not meet requirements and were not detected) 
This functions encompasses the tradeoff between opening the thresholds to allow more faults 
through detection (that increase the probability of mission success) while also considering addi-
tional faults that are not detected. These cases may be minimally acceptable as these faults would 
only cause a fault of the core mission with the potential for the upper stage to close the mission. 
Premature identification of second faults would potentially result in the core stage calling for an 
abort, causing an end to the mission.  
A Genetic Algorithm8 was utilized to perform the optimization, due to the stochastic (random 
failure events, and input variables) and nonlinear (coupled threshold parameters and integrated 
navigation system) nature of the problem. This is contrast to other methods9,10 which focus on the 
statistical performance of the INS system. The algorithm operates by generating a population of 
random points within the potential design space, and then assessing each against the fitness func-
tion. After this data is collected, random pairs are selected out of the population and put through a 
competitive process. The better performing individuals are then put through a process called 
crossover (effectively breeding the characteristics of the best individuals) and mutation (allowing 
for random changes in population to enable robust exploration of the design space). These are 
typically performed by capturing each set of design variables as a representative binary string 
upon which crossover and mutation is applied. This process is repeated for several generations 
until the population has effectively converged to a global optimum solution. This assessment used 
the MatLAB Genetic Algorithm within its Optimization Toolkit11. Utilization of this framework 
allowed for rapid generation of unique input files to the INS model as well as processing and in-
tegration of simulation results. This toolkit is operated through a visual interface and manages all 
of the backend processes required in Genetic Algorithm-based optimizations. The MatLAB envi-
ronment allowed use of the Parallel Processing Toolkit12 enabling assessment of multiple individ-
uals simultaneously. This helped dramatically to improve run-time.  
Optimization Results 
For this assessment, a population of 20 was used. Each individual in the population is generat-
ed from a Monte Carlo assessment of 100 dispersed runs in terms of sensor errors and fault 
events. The populations typically converged to a global solution in 20-30 generations.  This anal-
ysis assumed 4 variables per type of sensor, encapsulating both settings for accelerometers and 
gyroscopes, with the noise terms being optimized on a logarithmic scale to provide a wide range. 
A graphic representation of the optimization process is provided in Figure 5.  This graphic shows 
the convergence of the population to the optimal solution in the upper left line chart. The steps 
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down in fitness, represent where cross-over and mutation processes generated an individual with 
performance better than any of the previous population. The bar chart in the top right depicts the 
best solution. The bottom histograms show the score distribution across the latest generation and 
the individual scores of each individual. This plot is unique to the optimization of gyroscope 
terms over the entire mission. 
 
Figure 5: Genetic Algorithm Optimization Process 
Due to the coupling between variables, one set of thresholds across the entire mission is not 
considered optimal. Re-optimizing across individual sub-periods across the mission (as proposed 
in the FDIR operational architecture laid out above) allows for improved performance and tuned 
threshold capability across the entire mission window. The thresholds were optimized across time 
periods matching the proposed schedule. This schedule was developed to allow for quick thresh-
olds changes during early flight dynamics (including high dynamic environments) and then stabi-
lizes out for longer periods with relatively smooth and stable flight. The optimization process was 
repeated for each focused time period with faults limited to each for gyroscope and accelerometer 
failure events independently.  
Upon integrated analysis, the shifting thresholds caused disruptions in fault detection due to 
periods where the thresholds would become tighter, inducing detection of smaller faults not de-
tected during an earlier time period. To address this, the thresholds were optimized all-at-once to 
second sensor faults dispersed across the entire flight trajectory. This caused an increase in num-
ber of design variables per optimization from 4 to 24 (for gyroscope and accelerometer faults in-
dependently). In order to accommodate the larger design space, the number of variables was re-
duced to 2 for each sensor type per time.   
The performance results of each threshold provides insight into the capability of the simula-
tion. For this assessment, 1000 cases (up from the original 100) were assessed with the RINU 
standalone model, injecting faults of random time, axis, and magnitude of a second fault event, 
assuming an initial large bias shift at launch to simulate a first sensor channel failure. A summary 
of the thresholds for the accelerometer channels is given in Table 3, which compares results for 
the baseline thresholds, an optimization assuming one threshold for failures across the entire 
flight, and an optimized schedule. The results show there is minimal additional benefit to tuning 
the accelerometer errors, as even with 1000 runs, with typically only 10% of the runs successfully 
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met the mission requirements with the modeled fault events. For optimizing one set of thresholds, 
a large increase in successful cases not having a fault detected is increased, but at the cost of also 
increasing the number of unsuccessful missions. Optimizing the thresholds across time did serve 
to minimize the number of unsuccessful missions not detected in flight, but also reduced the 
number of successful missions completed. The baseline thresholds provide a balance between the 
two, and program-level mission risk perspectives inform the switching to other sets of thresholds.  
Table 3 Accelerometer Threshold Performance 
Case Number 
of Cases 
Min. 
Time 
of 
Fault 
Max. 
Time 
of 
Fault 
Min. Fault 
Magnitude 
(log gError! 
Bookmark not 
defined.) 
Max. Fault 
Magnitude 
(log gError! 
Bookmark not 
defined.) 
Number 
Met Or-
bital 
Insertion 
Number 
Met and 
Not De-
tected 
Number Not 
Met and Not 
Detected 
Baseline 
Threshold 
1000.00 10.00 450.00 -3.00 1.00 115 34 12 
Single 
Optimized 
Threshold 
1000.00 10.00 450.00 -3.00 1.00 143 102 90 
Optimized 
Threshold 
Schedule 
1000.00 10.00 450.00 -3.00 1.00 123 14 4 
 
In terms of gyroscope capability, there is a much larger capability enabled, as seen in Table 4. 
By tuning the input thresholds, a large number of additional passing cases are not declared faulted 
due to FDIR. Additionally, this benefit is much larger than the additional number of cases not 
detected that do not meet mission requirements. This is seen as a reduced sensitivity to gyroscope 
fault events over the course of the flight. 
Table 4 Gyroscope Threshold Performance 
Case Number 
of Cases 
Min. 
Time 
of 
Fault 
Max. 
Time 
of 
Fault 
Min. Fault 
Magnitude 
(log deg/hr) 
Max. Fault 
Magnitude 
(log deg/hr) 
Number 
Met Or-
bital 
Insertion 
Number 
Met and 
Not De-
tected 
Number 
Not Met 
and Not 
Detected 
Baseline 
Threshold 
1000.00 10.00 450.00 -1.00 2.00 800 240 0 
Single 
Optimized 
Threshold 
1000.00 10.00 450.00 -1.00 2.00 800 757 114 
Optimized 
Threshold 
Schedule 
1000.00 10.00 450.00 -1.00 2.00 806 767 75 
 
THRESHOLD SCHEDULE VERIFICATION APPROACH 
To provide verification of this capability, these thresholds were implemented into MAVERIC 
to capture performance using a large number of runs, 4000. This is used to demonstrate the per-
formance of the algorithms with a complete schedule over the flight. In addition to capturing the 
performance of the optimized thresholds, baseline scenarios were also assessed, which used a 
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fixed thresholds set. For these cases, fault magnitudes were dispersed uniformly across [-1,1] g 
for accelerometer bias shifts, and [-100,100] deg/hr for gyroscope fault events. Table 5 shows the 
capability of the optimized thresholds in terms of meeting the orbital insertion targets.  
Table 5 Performance of Thresholds in MAVERIC 
 Baseline/Fixed Threshold Optimized Single Thresholds Optimized Threshold    
Schedule 
Type 
of 
Fault 
Time 
of 2nd 
Fault 
# Met # Met + 
Not 
Detect 
# Not 
Met + 
Not 
Detect 
# Met # Met + 
Not 
Detect 
# Not 
Met + 
Not 
Detect 
# Met # Met + 
Not De-
tect 
# Not 
Met + 
Not 
Detect 
Accel. 
[10, 
500] 
194 153 32 194 142 32 194 145 32 
Gyro. 
[10, 
500] 
2554 183 0 2529 1803 354 2564 1930 216 
 
This verification assessment in MAVERIC demonstrates the same performance of the thresh-
olds as compared to the standalone model results. Again, the optimized accelerometer thresholds 
perform very similar to the baseline values with the gyroscope channels vastly reducing the prob-
ability of false detections. This provides evidence to support the de-coupling of FDIR analysis 
from the 6DOF models, demonstrating minimum effect due to GNC algorithm and coupling sen-
sitivities. 
To provide insight into algorithm robustness, additional Monte Carlos were performed focus-
ing on additional failure mechanism: Scale Factor shifts (correlating the sensor error to the input 
dynamics), and null errors (where the output defaults to 0.00). For this analysis, the baseline and 
optimized (one threshold across entire mission) threshold performance is demonstrated against 
random magnitude (for scale factor, in units of PPM), axis, and time (across the entire trajectory). 
Table 6 and Table 7 document the results for the accelerometer and gyroscope channels, respec-
tively.  
Table 6: Threshold Performance against Accelerometer Null and SF Faults 
Fault Scenario Magnitude 
(log ppm) 
Thresholds  
Used 
Num. 
Met 
Num. Met and 
Not Detected 
Num. Not Met 
and Not Detected 
2nd-null n/a Baseline 33 32 5 
2nd-SF [-3,5] Baseline 1428 1322 78 
2nd-null n/a Optimized 33 25 0 
2nd-SF [-3,5] Optimized 1428 1211 18 
 
Table 7 Thresholds Performance against Gyro Null and SF Faults 
Fault Scenario Magnitude 
(log ppm) 
Thresholds  
Used 
Num. 
Met 
Num. Met and 
Not Detected 
Num. Not Met 
and Not Detected 
2nd-null n/a Baseline 671 14 0 
2nd-SF [-3,5] Baseline 1898 1694 12 
2nd-null n/a Optimized 587 360 3 
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2nd-SF [-3,5] Optimized 1895 1863 44 
 
The results presented mirror those demonstrated for bias shift-type fault behavior. Again, the 
baseline accelerometer thresholds are shown to be well-tuned for the fault conditions simulated. 
In comparison, the optimized gyro parameters vastly increased the number of successful mission 
scenarios, at a very small cost of missed detections, also matching behavior over the nominal tra-
jectory. These results demonstrate the robustness of the algorithms to additional failure scenarios, 
both in their capabilities and limited effects on missed detections.  
CONCLUSION 
In order to maximize probability of success against the vehicle's insertion requirements, the 
FDIR thresholds have been optimized to minimize the probability of false detection. A Genetic 
Algorithm was utilized where each member of the population represented the statistical results of 
a Monte Carlo open-loop simulation utilizing a verified INS software model. This approach opti-
mized the threshold values across the trajectory in an all-at-once manner to find a global opti-
mized schedule. This has improved the probability of meeting the desired performance under sec-
ond fault conditions on the gyroscope and accelerometer channels under nominal flight. Due to 
the limited evidence for improved performance under optimized accelerometer thresholds, the 
baseline parameters have been kept in use. Additionally, this limits SLS testing and software veri-
fication requirements. The optimized gyroscope parameters are being used, though, due to their 
clear improvement in performance under the modeled scenarios.  
These thresholds were optimized against bias shifts, verified against scale factor and null fault 
conditions, and assessed in both standalone and integrated vehicle models.  The chosen values 
provide an improvement of flight capability for reducing false detection rates of second failure 
faults. This is enabled by the inherent margin between SLS insertion requirements and RINU per-
formance requirements. The results presented are optimized against the current design trajectory, 
and will be re-verified as part of further verification analysis and flight readiness assessments to 
demonstrate their capability. Additionally these thresholds will be tested as part of software and 
hardware-in-the-loop testing to demonstrate and verify the FSW to RINU FDIR interface, usage 
of FDIR schedule, and operational data. Additionally, these thresholds will be further validated 
against RINU sensor data collected during Green Run to both validate the underlying FDIR 
standalone model and its performance under flight-like conditions.  
This optimization approach was only possible due to the large amount of design into the INS 
design, both hardware and software, with thorough understanding of the underlying fault detec-
tion algorithms. With this knowledge, the design space was able to be reduced to limit the need 
for a large population. This was necessary due to each member in the population being the statis-
tical results of a stochastic open-loop analysis. Additionally, this approach was enabled due to the 
systems engineering processes focused on managing system- and sub-system level margins. For a 
design scenario with limited performance margin, this approach would provide a minimal benefit. 
This scenario focused on an ascent-only scenario. As these systems are integrated onto future ve-
hicles13,14,15 with longer lifetimes, more insight is needed in definition of the mission schedule, 
specifically over long coast. Also, the computational runtime per member increases dramatically 
as the analysis expands from 100's of seconds to several hours, requiring a more nuanced ap-
proach. This analysis utilized MatLAB'S built-in Genetic Algorithm Toolkit, further tweaking 
and modification of the input parameters could provide improved performance  as well increasing 
the number of individuals in the population. A Mutli-objective Genetic Algorithm16,,17 could also 
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be utilized to provide insight into the trade between optimizing mission success and fault detec-
tion. 
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